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Emergency Services Research in Great Britain
Edward H. Blum
I. INTRODUCTION
On a trip to Great Britain during JUly 1975, I talked
with a number of people engaged in research on municipal
emergency services. This working paper summarizes these
conversations. It is being circulated as a WP because its
technical content may be of interest to a number of people
within IIASA.
II. FIRE PROTECTION
In Great Britain, systems analytic work on fire
protection is centered largely in a small group in the
Scientific Adviser's Branch of the Home Office. This group
conducts a considerable amount of analysis itself, coordi-
nates a relatively small amount of analytical work performed
at the Fire Research Station in Boreham Wood (a northern
London suburb), and supervises contracts let to consultant
groups. The principal consultant group working in this
area is the Local Government Operational Research Unit
(LoGORU), set up in 1965 by the Royal Institute of Public
Administration.
On this trip, I visited both the group in the Home
Office, directed by Mrs. Jane Hogg (a professional acquain-
tance since 1968), and the group at the Local Government
Operational Research Unit working with her.
FP 1: Scientific Adviser's Branch, The Home Office
Met with:
o Mr. J.K.S. Clayton, Director, Scientific Adviser's
Branch
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o Mrs. Jane Hogg, M. Sc., Head, Fire Protection Group
o Dr. Ronald Rutstein, Fire Protection Group
o Mr. Michael G. Mytton, Fire Protection Group
Address: Scientific Advisory Branch
Home Office
Horseferry House
Dean Ryle Street
London SW1P 2AW
Telephone: 01-834-6655
Jane Hogg established her group, against much opposi-
tion from administrators in the line Fire Department part
of the Horne Office, in 1968. It quickly received the
blessings of the several top-level commissions that examined
British Fire Services between 1968 and 1972, and is always
noted favorably in the Annual Report of the Chief Fire
Inspector, yet a third part of the Horne Office concerned
with fire protection. But her work has been part of a
continual uphill battle against the old-line administrators,
who are fighting against "encroachment" by scientific civil
servants throughout the British government.
As a result, though her group has produced much tech-
nically first-rate work, among the leading work in its field
internationally, it has yet to gain a secure footing in the
civil service or to make much headway against the national
fire administrators, whom it seems to make insecure.
One dramatic example of the battle is particularly
painful to the group and strikingly absurd to outsiders:
the Fire Department has prohibited Jane or her group from
having direct contact with the local fire brigades. The
group cannot talk to the fire brigades or visit them, or
invite them formally to review the analytical work, without
the express permission of the line administrators, which
is almost never granted. This prohibition stands in spite
of repeated interest in Jane's work on the part of several
major fire brigades; her contact with them continues to be
- 3 -
at professional meetings, through the formal publications,
and through the medium of her few consultants. Since the
Fire Department administrators outrank (and out-clout) the
Scientific Adviser's Branch, the group feels it would be
destroyed (in classic civil service fashion) if it sub-
verted'the prohibition, either openly or semi-covertly.
These dispiriting restrictions notwithstanding, the
group continues to conduct and publish good work. And,
through its contract with LoGORU, it is having the models
and methods tested, refined, and evaluated in selected
localities. The results from the tests thus far appear
to be quite good. The group is hopeful, therefore, that
it may be on the way toward getting distillations of the
models' results accepted at the top as the basis for new
fire cover and deployment standards. Even if only partly
successful in doing so, they could thus change the rules
by which the administrators play (and the inspectors
enforce), and influence--hopefully, improve--fire protec-
tion, despite their nominal lack of clout.
The group's work has focussed on the following
questions:
a) What are the effects on fire damage, in different
classes of buildings, of changing the response
times of needed fire-fighting appliances? (An
"appliance" is a single unit or piece of motorized
fire-fighting equipment, with the crew of men
assigned to it.)
b) Given a loss-versus-response times function, how
should one site fire stations to achieve most
effective coverage?
c) If one wants to minimize for the community the
total cost of fire losses and fire brigade
expenses, how many units should be stationed at
each site? (This question also entails considering
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possible unavailability of appliances, the number
of appliances required for large incidents, and
the requirement imposed for initial response to
incoming alarms. One also has the option,
restricted in places, of staffing with full-time
personnel, using part-time, retained personnel,
or relying on volunteers--with very different costs
and potentially different performances.)
Of these, given the work done elsewhere (especially
by Rand's group in New York), the most difficult question
is the first. There is not enough theory to describe
well the underlying processes, and data for losses and
response times are generally poor. Jane has been most
fortunate, however, to have available through the Home
Office the best data of this kind in the world. Using it,
she and her colleagues have developed some relatively simple
but respectable models and estimated consistent coefficients.
(I reserve, however, a number of theoretical and practical
objections to aspects of the models and the estimation.)
As refined through successive evolutions, these models
form the objective function for the siting models, which
largely evaluate large numbers of possible site combinations,
using basic ordering techniques to trim the trees and
enumerative search techniques to focus on the most promising
combinations. The approach is mainly heuristic, though
portions of it incorporate known optimization techniques.
In all the examples published thus far, the total cost
curve is very flat near its minimum. In one example, the
maximum difference in total cost in the range between 9
appliances overall and 14 was barely 5% of the total--well
within the uncertainty in the loss estimates.
We spent several hours profitably discussing the models
in detail, mulling over the unresolved problems, disputing
the various approaches to analyzing and using loss functions,
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and comparing the results of her work with Rand's. She
has begun basing her more recent analyses on the much more
extensive Rand research, and had some useful comments and
critiques on it. Jane supplied several reports, and sent
a package with others that arrived at IIASA before I
returned.
In addition, she supplied some general references
(including The Fire Protection Directory, which contains
information about fire protection on the continent that the
IIASA library has been unable to obtain in ten months of
searching), and offered to help prepare sections on her
group's work, or critique appropriate sections of the
emergency services book.
The group's publications include:
(1) J.M. Hogg, "The Siting of Fire Stations," Operational
Research Quarterly, 19, 275-287 (1968).
(2) "Planning for Fire Stations in Glasgow in 1980,"
Report #1/68.
(3) "Station Siting in Peterborough and Market Deeping,"
Report #7/70.
(4) "A Distribution Model for an Emergency Service,"
Report #8/70.
(5) "A Model of Fire Spread," Report #2/71.
(6) "Operational Research on Fire at the Home Office,"
paper read May 31, 1972, to the Manchester and District
Group of the Institute of Fire Engineers.
(7) "The Siting of Fire Stations in Northampton and
Northamptonshire," Report #4/73.
(8) "Losses in Relation to the Fire Brigade's Attendance
Time," Report #5/73.
(9) "The Number of Pumps Required in Northampton and
Northamptonshire," Report #2/75.
(10) "Methods of Planning Fire Cover Using Cost Effectiveness
Criteria," Report #7/75.
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(11) "The Number of Appliances Required in Manchester for
1985," Report #8/75.
In addition, they have made available a LoGORU report,
(12) "The Siting of Fire Stations in Manchester," LoGORU
Report #C-184, October 1974, by B. Pilgrim and T. Green.
Thermal Imaging
After we had thoroughly covered our mutual analyses,
we went up the hall to see some advanced technological
work the Scientific Adviser's Branch has undertaken--a
thermal imaging camera to detect hot spots and otherwise
help the fire service to see in smoke-filled environments.
The young man who had developed the camera showed it off
very proudly; it could easily discriminate the 0.20 C.
difference between white and black panels exposed to the
same floodlight.
As we talked, however, it became clear that (a) he
was unaware of the advanced state-of-the-art in thermal
imaging, developed for both military and medical applica-
tions, and thus did not know that more compact, more stable,
and less expensive equipment was already available essen-
tially off-the-shelf and (b) he had taken the technically
naive formulations of need offered by fire chiefs at face
value, without exploring the technical performance charac-
teristics such a device would really need to prove valuable
in the smoky fire environment.
To gain high sensitivity to small temperature differ-
ences, for example, the device was designed to cover its
full range of shades (black-grey-white) over 10 C.; all
temperatures 10 C. or more than the baseline thus registered
identically. I suggested changing the electronics to permit
modifying the sensitivity to make full scale 10 0 C. or
o100 C., as well, so that one could choose the range most
appropriate to the problem at hand. Otherwise, it might
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prove difficult even to find a hot flame in the midst of
a room full of swirling heated air Ｈ ｾ Ｉ Ｌ much less detect
a fire behind a wall or locate a body in a smoke-filled
room. He also needed alternative and better means of
filtering out unwanted signals (such as reflected sunlight)
and of enhancing the signal-to-noise ratio to eliminate
effects such as thermal radiation scattering by smoke.
Before embarking on further technological work, I
suggested he arrange some tests to ascertain what signatures
(in a signal-detection sense) were displayed by typical
important situations: horizontal bodies obscured by smoke;
fires, embers, or heated air plumes behind partitions;
smoldering fires behind dense smoke, etc. I also suggested
he talk with the various manufacturers of thermal-imaging
devices, to compare notes and see what combinations of the
most advanced technology he could put together, at least
as the next stage in development work. Their comments
indicated that the free consulting had been valuable, and
that they planned to try to follow some of the advice.
FP 2: Local Government Operational Research Unit
Met with:
o Mr. Brian Whitworth, Executive Director
o Dr. Barry Pilgrim, Head of Fire Protection Studies
Address: Local Government Operational Research Unit
201 Kings Road
Reading RGl 4LH
Telephone: 0734-580462
For mutual convenience, the meeting was held at LoGORU's
parent body in London: The Royal Institute of Public Admin-
istration, Hamilton House, Mabledon Place, London WC1H 9BO.
LoGORU's fire protection work stemmed from two sources:
First, of course, was its application, evaluation, and
refinement of Jane Hogg's fire cover models. Second, was
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some work stimulated by the major realignment of local
authorities that took place in 1974 (and which will be
completed in Scotland only this year), helping new juris-
dictions to rationalize their service.
Under the contract with Jane Hogg, LoGORU 1S applying
her group's models to ten selected localities, ranging
from dense urban areas (e.g., Merseyside) to sparse rural
areas, to see how readily they can be applied and how well
the results are or can be accepted by the fire service.
The intent of the work is to test whether (and then to build
confidence that) the models can be used as a basis for
national standards, eventually to be applied to all fire
brigades in the country--except Greater London, which every-
one views as the outstanding exception that must be treated
separately. (There are currently about 130 fire brigades
in Great Britain; though the number is changing through
consolidations and reorganizations, it has remained roughly
constant since the end of World War II, when the national-
ized fire service--pulled together from over 1400 pre-war
brigades--was returned to local authority.)
Barry Pilgrim noted that, for most of the areas
examined thus far, the fire incidence was so localized and
the number of fires relatively so small that the analysis
itself was relatively simple, almost trivial. Occasionally
the models did reveal things the fire brigades did not
already know; in one instance, the "revelation" arose from
incorrect data, though in the others the insights were
readily accepted by the fire officers once they had had
time to think about them. Even where the siting recommen-
dations closely matched those already developed by the
fire brigade, however, the models did provide quantitative
arguments and estimates where the fire brigade generally
had only qualitative feelings.
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It may be interesting to note here that Jane 80gg was
critical of LoGORU for relying so heavily on acceptance by
the fire brigade as a criterion of success, arguing that
if the models could do no more than tell the fire brigades
things they would accept immediately, and generally already
knew, they would not represent much of an advance, and
probably would not be worth the effort to develop, test,
and implement. Barry Pilgrim, on the other hand, argued
that if the models were to be more than abstract exercises
or interesting theory, they had to yield results that would
agree with experienced fire officers' judgments or at least
make enough sense to them to be accepted as realistic.
Barry's feeling, very close to mine, is that good models
should yield non-intuitive results in non-intuitive situa-
tions (i.e., where analytical assistance is needed), but
must yield intuitively acceptable results in situations
where intuition should work well. Nonetheless, there
seems to be a basic tension between Jane and Barry,
reflecting both the tension between analyst-as-modeller and
analyst-as-pragmatist and the tension inherent in Jane's
having to rely on LoGORU to do her hands-on work with the
fire service.
Barry noted that though the analysis, per se, was
usually fairly simple, the follow-through phase was usually
not. The fire brigades tended to become quite rigid once
they had decided upon station sites, tending to fight on
forever against other components of local or national
government that might want the land for other purposes;
in turn, some of the other parts of local authorities could
be quite rigid, too, and oppose the fire brigade for reasons
that made little real sense. There were also problems in
getting the fire officers to understand and be willing to
participate in the analysis, especially when the models
yielded early suggestions that were not immediately obvious.
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As we discussed our various experiences in implemen-
tation, it became clear that Britain has two important
structural influences making implementation relatively more
difficult than in the U.S. (and some continental European
countries). First is, of course, the rift between adminis-
trators and analysts, and the extreme defensive steps taken
by the national administrators to "protect" their positions.
Second is the relatively low level of education among top
fire officers. In Britain, few top officers seem to have
any college education at all, whereas in the U.S. many top
officers of major fire departments have at least taken
education in fire science or public administration and a
fair number have quite good technical education (e.g., New
York has several high-ranking officers with engineering
degrees; the Chief in Los Angeles has a master's in mathe-
matics). On the continent, following the tradition of
separating top from middle management {e.g., flihrung from
lei tung), officers and firemen form distinct and separate
hierarchies, with only rare promotions to officer (usually
near retirement) for those who have not entered as part of
the top group. In these countries, entry as an officer
requires a college degree, usually in engineering.
As one might have expected, given the nature of the
administrative bureaucracy, it seems unlikely that reports
on the implementation phase of LoGORU's work will ever see
the light of day. Indeed, there is every reason to believe
that the reports finally approved for release will omit all
but the barest technical details. That is, naturally,
disappointing, but perhaps inevitable.
III. EMERGENCY JI'lEDICAL SERVICES
The Local Government Reorganization of 1974 shifted
responsibility for emergency medical services from local
authorities to the National Health Services, part of the
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huge national Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS).
The aims of this shift were largely to ensure closer coor-
dination between ambulances and the doctors and hospitals
they serve, and to improve the quality of local services
through central planning and research and the development of
national performance standards.
Though much systems analytic work had been done on
emergency medical services, therefore, most of the specific
results have had to be rethought and redone to take into
account the new national perspective and the new organiza-
tional and operational structures.
Analytic work on emergency medical services is now
centered in the Operational Research Service (ORS) of DHSS,
which has a sizeable in-house staff and a fair-sized bUdget
for extramural research and consulting. Formally, the ORS
is a staff consultant group, with the operating arms of the
National Health Service among its main clients. It thus is
subject to all the pressures and cross-currents such groups
face, though it seems to have established itself better and
won more independence than the Scientific Advisory group
in the Home Office--perhaps because analysis is, in general,
better accepted as legitimate in health than it is in fire.
On this trip, I talked with people in ORS and with
several of its consultants, particularly with the National
Health Service Operational Research Group (NHSORG--recently
spun-off from LoGORU) and independent researchers.
EMS 1: Operational Research Service, Department of Health
and Social Security
Met with:
o Dr. D.Y. Coomber, Senior Principal Scientific
Officer, head of the Operational Research Service
o Dr. C. Himatsingani, Scientific Officer, ORS
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Address: Operational Research Service
Department of Health and Social Security
131-151 Great Titchfield Street
London WIP 8AD
Telephone: 01-636-1696
Norman Glass, recently of IIASA, now working at DHSS,
had arranged for me to meet with Dr. Himatsingani, an
operational research specialist knowledgeable about work on
emergency medical services, though not currently engaged
in it. He was most cooperative and helpful, and spent
several hours reviewing recent work and calling various
people to obtain further names and references.
Our discussions identified the following reports and
resource people to contact:
a) "Resource Consequences of Different Patterns of
Provision of Accident and Emergency Services,"
DHSS Report, 2 volumes, October 1972.
Done by Peter H. Gentle, M.D., both as an MSE thesis
and a DHSS report. The author is now with the
Tunbridge Health District
Sherwood Park
Pembury Road
Tunbridge Wells, Kent
Telephone: Tunbridge Wells 3811
This report has been approved by DHSS for external
distribution.
b) "Ambulance Service Performance Standards and
Measurement," 12 July 1974. Final Report by Orcon
Services to DHSS.
Prepared by Mr. Norman Webster, Senior Lecturer in
O.R., Cranfield Institute of Technology, Cranfield,
Bedfordshire.
This report is the basis for new DHSS standards
specifying that, in all districts, ambulance response
of Operational
"study of the
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times must be less than 8 minutes at least 50 per-
cent of the time and less than 20 minutes at least
95 percent of the time. A sanitized version has
been approved for external distribution. Unfortu-
nately, it lacks the highly detailed data that make
the complete version (which sins by identifying the
districts in which the performance data were
obtained) a unique resource in the field.
c) Professor R.N. Curnow, Department
Research, University of Reading.
Reading Ambulance Service," 1973.
d) Dr. Canvin, Operational Research Unit, University
of Exeter.
e) A private consultant, Mr. Donald Hicks,
26 SE Kingsmark Avenue, Chepstow, Bonmouthshire
NP6 5LY.
Hicks, said Dr. Himatsingani, had data to show that
in certain areas real emergencies made up only 6%
of the cases (the preponderance of the rest being
simple transport), but constituted 30% of the
effective workload for the service force.
Himatsingani then introduced me to Dr. Coomber, who
was in the midst of putting together a progress report.
He noted work by Dr. Kenneth Groom and his associates at
NHSORG, developing ambulance cover models (similar to the
fire cover models developed by Jane Hogg), which DHSS hoped
might become the basis for putting into effect nationwide
the performance standards developed by the Cranfield group
(see (b) above). He was pleased to hear of the synthesis
being developed at IIASA, and said he would be glad to review
or arrange for review of draft chapters on emergency medical
services, with particular attention to the material on Great
Britain.
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Coomber suggested a return trip to London once draft
chapters were in hand. He offered to help set things up to
visit DI-iSS formally, beginning at the top of the adminis-
trative hierarchy, to get formal approval to use and publish
all the material I had already obtained and would obtain
and to get the blessing of DHSS for the UK part of the
synthesis project. Touching all the bases would make his
job easier in cooperating further with me, he explained,
and would also minimize any screaming or recriminations
about what was said in the final publication. He suggested
calling him about six weeks before the visit: then he would
suggest what to write to whom.
EMS 2: National Health Service Operational Research
Group (NHSORG)
Met with:
o Dr. Kenneth Groom, Director, NHSORG
Address: National Health Service Operational
Research Group
310 Kings Road
Reading RGI 4HX
Telephone: 0734-64678 or 65817
Ken Groom met me in London at the Royal Institute
of Public Administration, accompanying Brian Whitworth and
Barry Pilgrim. He and Brian explained that the group had
been split off from LoGORU at the request of the National
Health Service, when the NHS had taken over responsibility
for ambulance services. At first the staff had overlapped
and been shared, but now as the new group acquired enough
funding and began establishing its own identity, it was
becoming more separate, though still physically adjacent
and close professionally.
Ken's group has developed several relatively simple
queueing and set-covering models for determining good
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ambulance cover and for assessing whether specified numbers
and configurations of ambulances will meet the new NHS
response-time standards. Under NHS sponsorship, monitored
by ORS, they are now testing the models--and validating them
with operational data--in six areas, chosen to represent a
fair sample of the range of ambulance service conditions
encountered in Great Britain.
The results obtained thus far are encouraging, though
Ken is encountering many of the same problems in under-
standing, acceptance, and implementation that Barry Pilgrim
has encountered in fire. Ken feels that his main accom-
plishment thus far, besides validating the models, has been
to persuade NHS to take a fresh look at the possible value
of merging its two-tier ambulance systems back into one-
tier or modified-one-tier systems. In several of the regions
examined, such modifications could reduce by over 20% the
number of ambulances (and crews) needed to meet the response-
time standards for emergency calls.
Perhaps a few words of explanation are in order:
In Britain, as in most other countries, ambulances serve
two relatively distinct purposes--(l) responding to emergency
calls, trying to stabilize the condition of often quite sick
or badly injured people, and bringing the people to hospital
emergency rooms. In all these operations, time is of the
essence. (2) Providing non-emergency taxi service to trans-
port to doctors and hospitals people who otherwise would
find it hard to get around or whose doctors feel they ought
to travel under semi-medical supervision. In this operation,
the constraints are those of scheduling; hospitals and
doctors tend to want their patients at particular times,
and the ambulance service does its best to oblige.
In some places, the same set of vehicles and personnel
handles both functions. This arrangement is termed a "one-
tier" system. In others (e.g., Moscow, New York, Vienna,
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and most of Britain), the emergency and transport services
are separate, though usually managed by the same authority
(and often with the transport service a training ground for
the emergency service). These are termed "two-tier" systems.
The arguments for separate services are typically that
(a) the personnel skills and equipment needed for the trans-
port service are much less than those needed for emergencies.
Moreover, transport is a daytime service, while emergencies
occur in all 24 hours, so that the services are distinct.
(b) Transport demands can be extremely open-ended, so that
in a one-tier system they can readily become the tail that
wags the dog, possibly tying up ambulances needed for
emergency service at critical times.
In the context of suburban and rural British health
service, however, Ken Groom and his staff have shown that
proper control--coordination, scheduling, and limiting of
appointments--can reduce peak demands for transport ambu-
lances and thus leave with very light loads some that can
become essentially reserve or back-up emergency ambulances,
given appropriate equipment. In queueing terms, a partial
merger, having some transport ambulances serve also as
emergency ambulances, increases the number of potential
servers, and thus reduces the probabilities of long delays
or long travel times. (Similar reasoning would appear to
apply as well to improving the undersupplied emergency--
Rettung--ambulance system in Vienna.)
The coordination on which such a system depended was
still a long way off, Ken cautioned, because the doctors
still regarded themselves as the centers around which all
else should revolve. They thus were not yet willing to
surrender any scheduling authority or even try to schedule
their patients in ways that would permit the ambulance
service to improve its services.
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Ken supplied three reports, the only ones thus far
approved for distribution:
(a) "A Hodel to Evaluate Emergency Ambulance Cover,"
K.N. Groom and N.P. Pearce, Report #75/1.
(b) "Planning Emergency Ambulance Cover in ｾ ｝ ･ ｳ ｴ
Glamorgan," K.N. Groom, K.E. Holloway, and
W.R. Mann, Report #75/4.
(c) NHSORG Annual Report for 1974-75, Report #75/7.
EMS 3: Independent Researchers
Talked by telephone with:
o Dr. Kenneth Lee, Lecturer in Health Economics
Nuffield Centre for Health Services Studies
The University of Leeds
Clarendon Road
Leeds, LS2 9PL
Telephone: 0532-459034
He has prepared a report on the operation of
ambulance services in the UK, and written several
papers about emergency medical services.
o Dr. Daniel Davidson
IBM Scientific Centre
Meadow Road
Peterlee, County Durham
Telephone: 078-323-3322
He has worked extensively on the scheduling of
transport ambulances in Scotland, and has written
about the work.
